Thursday, February 11, 2010
Online Anonymity: A Fleeting Assumption
The apparent situation becomes obvious by the millions of investment dollars being spent on up-and-coming companies like Adchemy who aggregate and employ some of the most brilliant minds of our time in search of cutting edge computing techniques and algorithms designed to highly influence current standards in data mining, machine learning, and statistical inference (forming conclusions based on statistical data).
These companies hope to exploit masses of online data (generally) collected without the consent of participating consumers with the intention of personalized marketing and customer experience on the Web.
As explained by the chief executive of Adchemy here:
“It [Adchemy] doesn’t really identify a person,” but “it can identify the sorts of people -– by age, gender and interests -– that advertisers want to pinpoint.”
Basically, the company doesn’t reveal names to advertisers, and thus claims privacy is concealed. But what I wonder is that if all facets of a person’s life are available and being capitalized on by firms using algorithmic aggregators for “personalized online experience,” what’s the difference!? They’re tracking our movements down to the IP address through which we connect our computers to the Web. If you’re the sole user of your pc, then you could pretty much deduce that, to them, your name isn’t even relevant, and indeed your IP will work splendidly in identifying you and your not-exactly private activities. Companies like Accenture who invested heavily in Adchemy over the past year, know exactly whats up.
The blunt truth about the commercial implications of data mining technologies is summed up nicely in the last paragraph of an article I found at blogs.nytimes.com:
“…the technology raises all sorts of privacy questions. But this kind of targeted marketing is becoming the way of the Web, and Accenture wants to get into the game.”
I think developers understand precisely what the privacy concerns are, but until federal regulations stop them in their tracks, they’ll just continue doing it because it’s insanely lucrative.
Sunday, February 7, 2010
Enterpreting the 4th Amendment: Olmsted & Katz
In the case of Olmsted v. United States, Mr Ralph Olmsted's claims for invasion of privacy by investigating officials were deemed to in no way violate his 4th Amendment rights. Only 39 years later in a fundamentally similar case, Katz v. United States, the supreme court ruled that 4th Amendment rights were indeed violated by F.B.I. detectives.
I decided to dig into the reasons behind such an obvious philosophical inconsistency in our highest office of law.
It appeared that the discrepancy was in the abstract interpretations of "unreasonable search and seizure" delegated by the 4th Amendment.
Olmsted v United States
Ralph Olmsted was tried for running alcohol during Prohibition on evidence gathered though electronic wiretapping of his home and office.
In an article discussing the Olmsted case here, the courts declared:
"The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things - the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The amendment does not forbid what was done here for there was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the sense of hearing and that only. There was not entry of the houses. The language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded. Since the evidence was a conversation and no entry was made into Olmstead's home, there was therefore no violation of his rights against unreasonable search and seizure."
Simply put, the court concluded that search and seizure of physical things such has his person, house, papers, and effects constituted a violation of the 4th amendment. Since they regarded the data recordings of fluctuations in air pressure coming from the mouth of Mr. Olmsted to be not physical in nature, the incriminating phone calls made by Olmsted were admissible, and did not violate his 4th Amendment rights to “unreasonable search and seizure.”
39 years later “unreasonable search and seizure” was to be defined fundamentally contrary to the previous Supreme Court assessment. In the case Katz v. United States the defendant declared a violation in his 4th Amendment rights and was acquitted on grounds that:
“The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements.”
and;
“Because the Fourth Amendment protects people, rather than places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”
Interestingly, dissenting Justice Black argued that “the decision rendered by the Katz Court effectively amounts to a revision of the Fourth Amendment.” He brought fourth an ideological disagreement about interpreting v. elaborating constitutional amendments. Although I agree that rules should be interpreted within the confines of their corresponding literature, I disagree with Justice Black’s assessment about the magnitude of interpretation put forth by the court ruling. I think to look at the 4th Amendment solely in terms of blunt objects is a misapplication and misinterpretation of privacy implied by our Bill of Rights in light of technological advances made in the twenty-first century. (qtd from here).